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Abstract
The language MSR has successfully been used in the past to prove undecidability
results about security protocols modeled according to the Dolev-Yao abstraction.
In this paper, we revise this formalism into a ﬂexible speciﬁcation framework for
complex crypto-protocols. More speciﬁcally, we equip it with an extensible typing
infrastructure based on dependent types with subsorting, which elegantly captures
and enforces basic relations among objects, such as between a public key and its
inverse. We also introduce the notion of memory predicate, where principals can
store information that survives role termination. These predicates allow specifying
complex protocols structured into a coordinated collection of subprotocols. More-
over, they permit describing diﬀerent attacker models using the same syntax as any
other role. We demonstrate this possibility and the precision of our type system by
presenting two formalizations of the Dolev-Yao intruder. We discuss two execution
models for this revised version of MSR, one sequential and one parallel, and prove
that the latter can be simulated by the former.
1 Introduction
The language MSR [8,15,9] is a formalism designed to give simple speciﬁca-
tions of authentication protocols within the Dolev-Yao abstraction of computer
security [20,14]. It models a protocol as a set of parametric multiset rewriting
rules augmented with existential quantiﬁcation as a device to guarantee the
freshness of newly generated data. Indeed, MSR is an acronym for MultiSet
Rewriting. As usual, multisets (also called bags) are algebraic structures that
diﬀer from sets by not collapsing multiple occurrences of an object (they can
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alternatively been seen as unordered sequences). Roles, i.e. the sequence of
messages sent or received by each principal participating in a protocol run, are
expressed as multiset rewriting rules communicating through dedicated role
state predicates that pass control and data to the next rule in the sequence.
Rules operate on states, deﬁned as multisets of ﬁrst-order atomic formulas
modeling the messages in transit, the role state predicates currently present,
and persistent information which establishes immutable relations such as be-
tween a key and its inverse.
MSR has successfully been used to prove that certifying the correctness of
an authentication protocol is in general undecidable [8,15]. We have moreover
showed its substantial equivalence in expressive power to extensions of popular
speciﬁcation languages for security protocols, such as strand spaces [16], and
further studied their similarities under the microscope of linear logic [6]. On
the practical side, MSR fuels the CAPSL authentication protocol veriﬁcation
tool in the form of the underlying CIL intermediate language [13].
In spite of these achievements, MSR is a very low level language, poorly
suited for the direct speciﬁcation of security protocols. In particular, the slack
constraints on the persistent information predicates present in a rule makes
designing automated support procedures diﬃcult and reasoning about speci-
ﬁcations error-prone. These predicates, together with an elementary form of
typing, describe associations among objects, such as between a key and the
principal who owns it; this could conceivably be used to catch such errors as
attempted accesses to unauthorized keys. Another shortcoming concerns its
rigid rule format that accounts for lengthy speciﬁcations (and the consequent
model-checking overhead [12]). Finally, the language deﬁned in [8,15,9] lacks
the expressiveness needed to describe but the simplest of authentication pro-
tocols. In particular, any protocol structured in a collection of subprotocols
lies outside the scope of this language.
In this paper, we propose a thorough redesign of MSR intended to es-
tablish it as a usable speciﬁcation framework for complex security protocols.
The major innovations include the adoption of a ﬂexible yet powerful typ-
ing methodology that subsumes persistent information predicates, and the
introduction of memory predicates that signiﬁcantly widen the range of appli-
cability of this formalism. The detailed deﬁnition of this language also allows
for a precise description of its execution semantics. We call this formalism
Typed MSR, or just MSR when no ambiguity can arise. It fully subsumes our
earlier presentations of this language [8,15].
The type annotations of our new language, drawn from the theory of de-
pendent types with subsorting, enable precise object classiﬁcations for exam-
ple by distinguishing keys on the basis of the principals they belong to, or in
function of their intended use. Therefore, the public key of any two principals
can be assigned a diﬀerent type, in turn distinct from their digital signature
keys. Protocol speciﬁcations, called protocol theories in MSR, are strongly
typed, and we have devised algorithms for statically catching type violations,
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e.g. the use of a shared key to perform public-key encryption [4]. Our typing
infrastructure can point to more subtle errors, such as a principal trying to
encrypt a message with a key that does not belong to him. A procedure for
enforcing such access control policies is analyzed in [3].
Memory predicates allow a principal to remember information across role
executions. Their presence opens the doors to the speciﬁcation of protocols
structured as a collection of coordinated subprotocols. This novel possibility
is exempliﬁed in [5], where we formalize the Neuman-Stubblebine repeated
authentication protocol [21], which lies outside the reaches of our previous
version of MSR. A particularly interesting application of memory predicates
is given by their role in the speciﬁcation of the intruder model against which
a protocol is to be analyzed. Indeed, our enhanced version of MSR allows
expressing an attacker as a distributed protocol that communicates through
dedicated memory predicates. We exemplify this technique by giving two
speciﬁcations of the generic Dolev-Yao intruder. We should stress that these
speciﬁcations lie completely within the the language of our present version
of MSR, while the attacker corresponded to a set of rules that did not fully
follow the syntax of protocols in [8,15,9].
The detailed deﬁnition of MSR presented in this paper enables an unam-
biguous description of its execution semantics. We propose two models: one
based on the sequential application of rules, while the second allows indepen-
dent rules to ﬁre in parallel. We prove that the latter mode can be emulated
by sequential execution. Although this result is not particularly surprising
in itself, the ability to give a completely formal proof further establishes the
merit of the precise deﬁnition of our language.
This paper is organized as follows: in Section 2, we deﬁne the term lan-
guage ofMSR. Section 3 introduces states and their components and Section 4
presents rules, roles and protocol theories. The sequential and parallel exe-
cution models of MSR are discussed and correlated in Section 5. Section 6
formalize two variants of the Dolev-Yao intruder model in our language. Fi-
nally, Section 7 concludes this paper and outlines directions of future work.
2 Typed Messages
In Section 2.1, we describe the messages, or more generally terms, that form
the core of MSR. Then in Section 2.2, we introduce the typing infrastructure
that allow us to make sense of these terms. We will need them in the deﬁnition
of protocol rules in Section 4. We conclude in Section 2.3 by pointing out
the major diﬀerences with respect to the messages used in previous work on
MSR [8,9].
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2.1 Messages
Messages are obtained by applying a number of message forming constructs,
discussed below, to a variety of atomic messages. The atomic messages we
will consider in this paper are principal identiﬁers, keys, nonces, and raw
data (i.e. pieces of data that have no other function in a protocol than to be
transmitted). We formalize our notion of atomic message by means of the
following grammatical productions:
Atomic messages: a ::= A (Principal)
| k (Key)
| n (Nonce)
| m (Raw datum)
Here and in the rest of the paper, A, k, n, and m will range over principal
names, keys, nonces, and raw data respectively. We will sometimes also use
B to denote a principal. Although we will limit the discussion in this paper
to these kinds of atomic messages, it should be noted that others can be
accommodated by extending the appropriate deﬁnitions.
Themessage constructors we will consider consist of concatenation, shared-
key encryption, and public-key encryption. Altogether, they give rise to the
following deﬁnition of a message, or more properly a term.
Messages: t ::= a (Atomic messages)
| x (Variables)
| t1 t2 (Concatenation)
| {t}k (Symmetric-key encryption)
| { t} k (Asymmetric-key encryption)
We will use the letter t, possibly sub- and/or super-scripted, to range over
terms. Observe that we use a diﬀerent syntax for shared-key and public-key
encryption. We could have identiﬁed them, as it is done in many approaches.
We choose instead to distinguish them to show the ﬂexibility and precision of
our technique.
Again, other constructors, for example digital signatures and hash func-
tions, can easily be accommodated by extending the appropriate deﬁnitions.
We refrain from doing so since their inclusion would lengthen the discussion
without introducing substantially new concepts.
Type tuples (discussed in Section 3) and protocol rules (see Section 4) rely
on objects that may contain variables to be instantiated during type-checking
(this aspect is formalized in [4]) and execution, respectively. A parametric
message allows variables where terms could appear in the messages of Sec-
tion 2.1.
We will write A (or B), k, n and m, variously decorated, for atomic con-
stants or variables that are principals, keys, nonces and raw data respectively.
Whenever the object we want to refer to cannot be but a constant (mostly in
4
Cervesato
the execution rules of Section 5), we will use the corresponding seriﬀed letters:
A (or B), k, n and m. Instead, the letters x, y and z will stand for terms that
must be variable. In some circumstances, we will need to refer to objects that
can be either variables or atomic message constants, but not composite terms.
We call these terms elementary and denote them with the letter e, variously
decorated.
Since most of the object we will be dealing with in the rest of the paper
contain variables, we will use the wording “term” (or “message”) to refer
to “parametric terms” (or “messages”). Whenever we will be working with
terms that do not contain variables, we will talk about “ground” terms (or
messages), unless clear from the context.
2.2 Types
While types played a very modest role in the original deﬁnition of MSR [8,9],
they stand at the core of the extension presented in this paper. Through
typing, we can enforce basic well-formedness conditions (e.g. that only keys
be used for encrypting a message), as described in detail in [4]. Types also
provide a statically checkable way to ascertain complex desiderata such as, for
example, that no principal may grab a key he/she is not entitled to access.
This aspect is thoroughly analyzed in [3]. The central role of types in our
present approach is witnessed by the fact that they subsume and integrally
replace the “persistent information” of the original MSR [9].
The typing machinery that best ﬁts our goals is based on the type-theoretic
notion of dependent product types with subsorting. Rather than delving into
the depth of the deﬁnitions and properties of this formalism, we will intro-
duce only the facets that we will use, and only to the extent we will need
them. In particular, we do not conduct an in-depth discussion of this type
theory; we will even stay away from the most exotic aspects of its syntax.
Readers who wish to further their understanding of this formalism are invited
to consult [11,18,1,22].
Types are syntactic constructions that are used to classify other syntactic
expression, such as terms. By doing so, they give them a meaning, saying
for example that an object we interpret as a key is not a nonce. Whenever
a key is used where a nonce is expected, something has gone wrong since the
meaning of this term has been violated. The types we will use in this paper
are summarized in the following grammar:
Types: τ ::= principal (Principals)
| nonce (Nonces)
| shK A B (Shared keys)
| pubK A (Public keys)
| privK k (Private keys)
| atm (Atomic messages)
| msg (Messages)
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In the sequel, τ , possibly variously decorated, will stand for a type. Needless
to say, the types “principal” and “nonce” are used to classify principals and
nonces respectively. The next three productions allow distinguishing between
shared keys, public keys and private keys. Dependent types oﬀer a simple and
ﬂexible way to express the relations that hold between keys and their owner or
other keys. Given principals “A” and “B”, a shared key “k” between “A” and
“B” will have type “shKAB”. Here, the type of the key depends on the speciﬁc
principals “A” and “B”. Similarly, a constant “k” is given type “pubK A” to
indicate that it is a public key belonging to “A”. We use dependent types
again to express the relation between a public key and its inverse. Continuing
with the last example, the inverse of “k” will have type “privK k”, from which
it is easy to establish that it belongs to principal “A”.
The type “atm” is intended to classify atomic terms, which clearly include
raw data, but also principal names, nonces and all the above key types. This
statement implies, for example, that a nonce “n” has both type “nonce” and
“atm”. We accommodate this form of hierarchical multiple classiﬁcation by
imposing a subsorting relation between types. We formalize this relation by
means of the following judgment:
τ :: τ ′ τ is a subsort of τ ′
In this paper, the subsorting relation requires that the types of principals,
nonces and keys be subtypes of atm. Its extension is expressed by means of
the following rules as far as atomic terms are concerned:
ss pr
principal :: atm
ss nnc
nonce :: atm
ss shK
shK A B :: atm
ss pbK
pubK A :: atm
ss pvK
privK k :: atm
These rules are parametric since, for example, ss shK establishes that “shKAB ::
atm” holds for any choice of the principals “A” and “B”.
The type msg is used to classify generic messages. Since nonces, keys, and
principal identiﬁers are routinely part of messages, we make atm a subsort of
msg:
ss atm
atm :: msg
Again, the types and the subsorting rules above should be thought of as
a reasonable instance of our approach rather than the approach itself. Other
schemas can be speciﬁed by deﬁning appropriate types and how they relate
to each other. For example, digital signatures could be accommodated by
introducing dedicated dependent types akin to “pubK A” and “privK k”. In
another scenario, an application may ﬁnd it convenient to see each of the key-
related types above as a subtype of a universal key type, say “key”, in turn a
subsort of msg. As a ﬁnal example, we may want to deﬁne distinct types for
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long-term keys and have them not be a subsort of msg, prohibiting in this way
the transmission of long-term secrets as parts of messages; more complex key
stratiﬁcations coud be captured as well. These possibilities are exempliﬁed
in [4,5].
In the ﬁrst part of this section, we have introduced terms and the types
intended to classify them. We will now present the typing rules that will
allow us to establish whether an expression built according to the syntax of
terms can be considered a ground message (more in general whether a given
expression free of variables has a certain type).
The rules below systematically reduce the typability of a composite term
to the validity of its subterms. This is adequate for constructors, but atomic
messages need to be treated specially unless we are willing to write new rules
for them each time we model a protocol. Independence of rules from actual
atomic messages is achieved through the notion of a signature. A signature,
written Σ, is a ﬁnite sequence of declarations that map atomic messages to
their type. More formally,
Signatures: Σ ::= · (Empty signature)
| Σ, a : τ (Atomic message declaration)
| ( . . . )
The dots in the last line express the fact that this deﬁnition is incomplete: we
will extend it in the next section.
We assume that each atomic message in a signature is declared exactly
once. We will also often elide the leading “·” from a non-empty signature, and
promote the extension operator “,” to denote signature union. This operation
is deﬁned only if the resulting sequence is itself a signature (in particular it
should not contain multiple declarations for the same constant).
Given the notions introduced so far, it is fairly easy to deﬁne a meaningful
type system for messages and the other types we have described. In order to
accomplish this goal, we will rely on the following message typing judgment:
Σ  t : τ Term t has type τ in signature Σ
All composite terms have type msg, given that their constituent submessages
are correctly typed. This implies that the subterms of a concatenation (t1 t2)
are themselves messages. On the other hand, the plaintext part t of an en-
crypted message {t}k should have type msg but k should be a shared key
between two principals. Terms encrypted with public keys, of the form { t} k,
are handled similarly. This intuition is formally captured in the following
typing rules for messages:
Σ  t1 : msg Σ  t2 : msg
mtp cnc
Σ  t1 t2 : msg
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Σ  t : msg Σ  k : shK A B
mtp ske
Σ  {t}k : msg
Σ  t : msg Σ  k : pubK A
mtp pke
Σ  {{t} k : msg
These rules are parametric, as witnessed by the numerous meta-variables they
contain, but also hypothetical in the sense that the validity of the consequent
relies on the validity of their premises.
The next rule reduces verifying that a term t has type τ to checking that
it has type τ ′ for some subsort of τ . In this way, we can for example use a
nonce or a key where an object of type msg is expected. The formal rule is as
follows:
Σ  t : τ ′ τ ′ :: τ
mtp ss
Σ  t : τ
The last term typing rule deals with elementary messages components. An
atomic message a has a type τ if the signature at hand contains the declaration
“a : τ”. The validity of the type τ in Σ is independently checked by verifying
the validity of a signature [4].
mtp a
(Σ, a : τ,Σ′)  a : τ
This concludes the presentation of the typing rules needed in this paper. It
should be noted that these rules do not guarantee that the signature decla-
rations obey the typing policy: for example, nothing forces the arguments A
and B of the type in the rightmost premise of rule mtp ske to be principals.
Although well-typed signatures are an essential component of a correct spec-
iﬁcation, we do not need to require them in this paper. These omitted typing
rules can be found in [4] together with procedures designed to validate every
element of an MSR protocol speciﬁcation.
For the convenience of the reader, we collect all the rules presented in this
paper in Appendix A.
2.3 Changes
We will now compare the above term infrastructure with the notion of message
used in earlier versions of MSR [8,9]. The main diﬀerences concern the types
and the way they are used.
(i) Structurally, the original presentation ofMSR referred to so-called simple
types, i.e. types that do not depend on terms. These types would permit
distinguishing objects into keys, nonces, messages, etc. (the taxonomy
was open-ended), but would not allow any ﬁner classiﬁcation [7]. Sub-
sorting introduced some ﬂexibility. Most of the information that is now
captured through types and especially their dependencies on terms was
then expressed by means “persistent predicates” that cluttered protocol
8
Cervesato
speciﬁcations and complicated reasoning about them. These entities have
been dropped.
(ii) Typing played a rather inessential role in [8,9]: constants were given
types, but rules themselves did not carry such information. Furthermore,
no type system was explicitly presented to validate terms or rules. Typing
is central to the language proposed in this paper: every object is typed.
Indeed, our approach allows not only verifying basic well-formedness con-
ditions (e.g. that no message is encrypted with a nonce) [4], but types
provide a statically checkable way to enforce complex requirements such
as, for example, that no principal uses a key he/she is not entitled to
access [3].
(iii) In this paper, we make a syntactic distinction between shared-key and
public-key encryption. Although not present in [8,9], we could have easily
distinguished the two forms of encryption in the earlier version of MSR.
3 Message Predicates and States
As we will see shortly, a state is a collection of specialized atomic ﬁrst-order
formulas. States are a fundamental concept inMSR. Indeed, they are the cen-
tral constituent of the snapshots of a protocol execution. They are the objects
transformed by rewrite rules to simulate message exchange and information
update. Finally, together with execution traces, they are the hypothetical
scenarios on which protocol analysis is based.
In this section, we will formalize the concept of state in MSR, together
with the constructions needed to implement it. In Section 3.1 we introduce
message tuples and a notion of type for them. Then in Section 3.2, we discuss
the message predicates that appear in a state, and in Section 3.3 we deﬁne
states.
3.1 Message Tuples and Dependent Types
As we will see shortly, message predicates are atomic ﬁrst-order formulas with
zero or more terms as their arguments. In this section, we are concerned with
formalizing the concept of tuple and presenting suitable types for them.
A message tuple is an ordered sequence of terms. It is trivially deﬁned as
follows:
Message tuples t ::= · (Empty tuple)
| t, t (Tuple extension)
We will often omit the leading · whenever a tuple is not empty.
It is tempting to deﬁne the type of a tuple as the sequence of the types of
its components. Therefore, if A is a principal name and kA is a public key for A,
the tuple (A, kA) would have type “principal× pubKA” (the Cartesian product
symbol “×” is the standard constructor for type tuples). This construction
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allows us to associate a generic principal with A’s public key: if B is another
principal, then (B, kA) will have this type as well. We will often need stricter
associations, such as between a principal and its own public key. In order
to achieve this, we will rely on the notion of dependent type tuple. In this
example, the tuple (A, kA) will be attributed type “principal
(A) × pubK A”,
where the variable A in “principal(A)” records the name of the principal at
hand and forces the type of the key to be “pubK A” for this particular A:
therefore (A, kA) is a valid pair of type “principal
(A) × pubK A”, but (B, kA) is
now ill-typed since kA has type “pubKA” rather than the expected “pubKB”.
3
We do attribute a type to a term tuple by collecting the type of each
constituent message, but we label these objects with variables to be used in
later types that may depend on them. A dependent type tuple is therefore an
ordered sequence of types parameterized as follows:
Type tuples τ ::= · (Empty tuple)
| τ (x) × τ (Type tuple extension)
In the second line of this deﬁnition, the notation (x) on the left of the Cartesian
product symbol binds the variable x in the type tuple τ to its right. Similarly
for example to a quantiﬁer, τ (x) is a binder. Variables that are not bound in
this way are said to be free. We will often be interested in closed type tuples,
all of whose variables are bound. The scope of a binder is the expression over
which its binding action spans. The scope of a type tuple component extends
to the entire type tuple to its right.
Given a dependent tuple type τ (x)× τ , we will drop the label (x) whenever
the variable x does not occur (free) in τ . The resulting simpliﬁed notation,
τ × τ , will help writing more legible speciﬁcations when possible. As for term
tuples, we will omit the leading “·” whenever convenient.
3.2 Message Predicates
The predicates that can enter a state or a rewrite rule are of three kinds:
• First, the predicate N( ) implements the contents of the public network in
a distributed fashion: for each (ground) message t currently in transit, the
state will contain a component of the form N(t).
• Second, active roles rely on a number of role state predicates, generally one
for each rule in them, of the form Ll( , . . . , ), where l is a unique identifying
label. The arguments of this predicate record the value of known parameters
of the execution of the role up to the current point.
3 Our dependent type tuples are usually called weak dependent sums in the type theoretic
community, and the standard notation for the dependent type tuple we have written as
“principal(A) × pubK A” is “ΣA : principal. pubK A”. We believe that our syntax is likely to
be more clear to the target audience of this paper.
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• Third, a principal A can store data in private memory predicates of the
form MA( , . . . , ) that survives role termination and can be used across the
execution of diﬀerent roles, as long as the principal stays the same.
The reader familiar with our previous work onMSR will have noticed a number
of diﬀerences with respect to the deﬁnitions given in [8,9]. Memory predicates
are indeed new. They are intended to model situations that need to maintain
data private across role executions: for example, this allows a principal to
remember its Kerberos ticket, or the trusted-third-party of a fair exchange
protocol to avoid fraudulent recoveries from aborted transactions. Another
diﬀerence with respect to earlier work is the absence of a dedicated predicate
retaining the intruder’s knowledge. This can however be easily implemented
using memory predicates, as we will see in Section 6.
Every protocol relies on a public network. Therefore, we will hardwire the
network predicate N( ) in our language. Local state and memory predicates
are diﬀerent: they are deﬁned on a per-protocol basis. This is similar to
principals and keys. We therefore maintain generality by declaring them as
part of the signature. We can now complete the deﬁnition of a signature as
follows:
Signatures Σ ::= · (Empty signature)
| Σ, a : τ (Atomic message declaration)
| Σ, Ll : τ (Local state predicate declaration)
| Σ, M : τ (Memory predicate declaration)
3.3 States
A multiset is a collection of objects whose multiplicity counts, but whose order
is irrelevant. We can see them either as unordered sequences, or as sets that
allow several instances of the same element to coexist (and prohibit collapsing
them). A state is a ﬁnite multiset of ground state predicates. The syntax of
states is partially formalized by means of the following grammar:
States: S ::= · (Empty state)
| S, N(t) (Extension with a network predicate)
| S, Ll(t ) (Extension with a role state predicate)
| S, MA(t ) (Extension with a memory predicate)
As for signatures, we will omit the leading “·” and interpret the extension
construct “,” as a union operator. It will be convenient to break from the
rigid format imposed by the above grammatical productions, and abstract
from the order of the component predicates of a state, treating them as a
multiset.
Protocol rules transform states. They do so by identifying a number of
component predicates, removing them from the state, and adding other, usu-
ally related, state elements. The antecedent and consequent of a rewrite rule
11
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embed therefore substates. However, in order to be applicable to a wide array
of states, rules usually contain variables that are instantiated at application
time. This calls for a parametric notion of states and message predicates.
For the most part, this reduces to admitting variables in the embedded
terms. However, role state predicates need to be created on the spot in order
to avoid interferences. We achieve this by introducing variables, denoted L,
that are instantiated to actual role state predicates during application. This
makes our language weakly second-order, although we could easily reduce it
to the ﬁrst order by interpreting a role state predicate Ll as the symbol L
indexed by a label l that is kept as a variable in rules. We however opt for
the more direct solution since it does not have any drawback, and allows for
slightly simpler deﬁnitions.
3.4 Changes
In the ﬁnal part of this section, we will analyze the main diﬀerences between
the notion of state and related concepts deﬁned above and the analogous
entities from the original deﬁnition of MSR [8,7].
Typing constitutes a minor distinction at this level since both versions of
MSR rely on typed predicate names, although little use of this aspect was made
in [8,7]. Our present usage of dependent type tuples is mostly a consequence
of our adoption of dependent types to classify terms. The major diﬀerences
regard instead the introduction of memory predicates and the elimination
of persistent information and distinguished intruder knowledge predicates in
states.
(i) In earlier versions of MSR, a principal had no way to remember data
across role executions: role state predicates are local to a role instance,
and network messages are not intended for storing private information.
Memory predicates survive role termination. As already mentioned, this
is useful when modeling scenarios that require remembering information
across role executions: for example, this allows a principal to remember
its Kerberos ticket, or the trusted-third-party of a fair exchange protocol
to avoid fraudulent recoveries from aborted transactions. Another novel
important use of memory predicate is in modeling protocols consisting
of a number of subprotocols: these predicates allow subprotocols to call
each other and share data.
(ii) There is no trace in the above deﬁnitions of the persistent information
that formed the immutable portion of the state of MSR in [8,7]. The
functionality of those predicates is now performed by the strong typing
policy of our updated framework, and in particular by our reliance on
dependent types.
(iii) Finally, we should point out the absence of a dedicated predicate intended
to hold the intruder’s knowledge. This aspect of our earlier work can now
be realized transparently through memory predicates, as we will witness
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in Section 6.
4 Multiset Rewriting Theories
In the past, crypto-protocols have often been presented as the temporal se-
quence of messages being transmitted during a “normal” run. Recent pro-
posals champion a view that places the involved parties in the foreground. A
protocol is then a collection of independent roles that communicate by ex-
changing messages, without any reference to runs of any kind. A role has
an owner, the principal that executes it, and speciﬁes the sequence of mes-
sages that he/she will send, possibly in response to receiving messages of some
expected form. A role can therefore be seen as a reactive system.
MSR adopts and formalizes this perspective. It represents protocols as
a set of syntactic entities that we also call roles. A role is itself given as a
parameterized collection of multiset rewrite rules that encode the expected
message receptions and the corresponding transmission. Rule ﬁring emulates
receiving (and accepting) a message and/or sending a message, the smallest
execution steps.
This section deﬁnes rules, roles and protocol theories. More speciﬁcally,
in Section 4.1, we introduce rules and their constituents. Roles are deﬁned in
Section 4.2. Then, in Section 4.3, we turn our attention to protocol theories,
which are our representation of protocols. Finally, in Section 4.4 we anticipate
the dynamic notion of an active role. Roles and protocol theories will be fur-
ther discussed in Sections 5 which focuses on execution. Section 4.5 examines
how these deﬁnitions diﬀer from our original presentation of MSR.
4.1 Rules
The core of a rule has the form “lhs → rhs”. Rules are the basic mechanism
that enables the transformation of a state into another, and therefore the
simulation of protocol execution: whenever the antecedent “lhs” matches part
of the current state, this portion may be substituted with the consequent “rhs”
(after some processing).
It is convenient to make protocol rules parametric so that the same rule can
be used in a number of slightly diﬀerent scenarios (e.g. without ﬁxing inter-
locutors or nonces). A typical rule will therefore mention variables x1, . . . , xn
that will be instantiated to actual terms during execution. Typed universal
quantiﬁers can conveniently express this fact so that rules assume the form
“∀x1 : τ1. . . . ∀xn : τn. (lhs → rhs)”. This idea is more precisely captured by
the following grammar:
Rule: r ::= lhs → rhs (Rule core)
| ∀x : τ. r (Parameter closure)
The universal quantiﬁers used in rules bind the variables they are applied to.
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Free variables can occur in the construction of a rule, but roles themselves
should have all their variables bound (this is enforced by the typing rules):
they are closed. The scope of all the binders in the above productions spans
over a whole rule.
If we think of variables as place holders, binders dictate which place hold-
ers must be instantiated with the same term (or predicate name). Variable
names implement this association. Besides a possibly mnemonic function, the
names of variables themselves have little importance and can be replaced with
arbitrary strings as long as no conﬂict with a free variable is introduced (an
eﬀect called variable capture: renaming would cause a free variable to become
bound). It will be convenient (e.g. when applying a substitution) to allow
the implicit capture-free renaming of bound variables in a predicate sequence
(this is known as α-conversion in type-theoretic circles).
The left-hand side, or antecedent, of a rule is a ﬁnite collection of paramet-
ric message predicates, and is therefore given by the following grammar for
predicate sequences:
Predicate sequences: lhs ::= · (Empty predicate sequence)
| lhs , N(t) (Extension with a network predicate)
| lhs , L(e) (Extension with a role state predicate)
| lhs , MA(t ) (Extension with a memory predicate)
Observe that rule antecedents and in general predicate sequences diﬀer from
states (see Section 3.3) mainly by the limited instantiation of role state predi-
cates: in a rule, these objects consist of a role state predicate variable applied
to as many elementary terms as dictated by its type. Recall that elementary
terms are either variables or atomic message constants. Network and memory
predicates will in general contain parametric terms, although not necessarily
raw variables as arguments.
The right-hand side, or consequent, of a rule consists of a predicate sequence
possibly preﬁxed by a ﬁnite string of fresh data declarations such as nonces or
short-term keys. We rely on the existential quantiﬁcation symbol to express
data generation. We have the following grammar:
Right-Hand sides: rhs ::= lhs (Sequence of message predicates)
| ∃x : τ. rhs (Fresh data generation)
The notion of fresh and bound variable discussed earlier applies also here.
Notice that the scope of these quantiﬁers is limited to the right-hand side of
the current rule. Later rules can refer to the values created by these variables
by introducing universal quantiﬁers of the proper type: synchronization is
ensured by their occurrence in the role state predicates. We have shown in [6]
that, when encoding of MSR in logic, our marker for fresh data is indeed
rendered by an existential quantiﬁcation.
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4.2 Roles
Role state predicates record information accessed by a rule. They are also
the mechanism by which a rule can enable the execution of another rule in
the same role. Relying on a ﬁxed protocol-wide set of role state predicates
is dangerous since it could cause unexpected interferences between diﬀerent
instances of a role executing at the same time. Instead, we make role state
predicates local to a role by requiring that fresh names be used each time a
new instance of a role is executed. As in the case of rule consequents, we
achieve this eﬀect by using existential quantiﬁers: we preﬁx a collection of
rules ρ that should share the same role state predicate L by a declaration of
the form “∃L : τ ”, where the typed existential quantiﬁer expresses the fact
that L should be instantiated with a fresh role state predicate name of type τ .
Again, a translation ofMSR in logic interprets these declarations as existential
quantiﬁcations [6].
With this insight, the following grammar deﬁnes the notion of rule collec-
tion:
Rule collections: ρ ::= · (Empty role)
| ∃L : τ . ρ (Role state predicate parameter declaration)
| r, ρ (Extension with a rule)
It should be observed that this deﬁnition allows for role state predicate pa-
rameters declarations and rules to be interleaved in a rule collection. We
will however generally divide a collection in a preamble where all roles state
parameters are declared, and a body that lists the rules that constitute a role.
A role is given as the association between a role owner A and a collection
of rules ρ. Some roles, such as those implementing a server or an intruder, are
intrinsically bound to a few speciﬁc principals, often just one. We call them
anchored roles and denote them as
ρA
Here, the role owner A is an actual principal name, a constant. Other roles can
be executed by any principal. In these cases A must be kept as a parameter
bound to the role. We use the following syntax to represent these generic
roles:
ρ∀A
where the implicitly typed universal quantiﬁcation symbol implies that A
should be instantiated to a principal before any rule in ρ is executed, and
sets the scope of the binding to ρ. Observe that in this case A is a variable.
With a slight abuse of notation, we will sometimes refer to roles of either kind
with the letter ρ, variously subscripted.
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4.3 Protocol Theories
A protocol theory, written P , is a ﬁnite collection of roles:
Protocol theories: P ::= · (Empty protocol theory)
| P, ρ∀A (Extension with a generic role)
| P, ρA (Extension with an anchored role)
It should be observed that we do not make any special provision for the in-
truder. The adversary is expressed as one or more roles in the same way as
the more legitimate message exchange in a protocol. We will illustrate how
this is achieved for the standard Dolev-Yao intruder and for a variant of it in
Section 6.
4.4 Active Roles
As we will see in Section 5, several instances of a given role, possibly stopped
at diﬀerent rules, can be present at any moment during execution. We record
the role instances currently in use, the point at which each is stopped, and
the principal who is executing them in an active role set. These objects are
ﬁnite collections of active roles, i.e. partially instantiated rule collections, each
labelled with a principal name. The following grammar captures their macro-
scopic structure:
Active role sets: R ::= · (No active role)
| R, ρA (Extension with an instantiated role)
The notation ρA is reminiscent of anchored roles. Active roles are actually
more liberal in that some of the role state predicate symbols as well as their
arguments may be instantiated. Intuitively, ρA results from instantiating the
contents of some role, with A is its elected owner.
4.5 Changes
It should be noted that the above syntax of rules is much more liberal than
the original deﬁnition of MSR [8,9]. We dedicate the remainder of this section
to commenting on these diﬀerences. We begin by noting structural changes
(items i–iii), then move to persistent information (item iv), memory predicates
(item v), and network predicates (item vi). We then continue with a number
of remarks concerning the role state predicates (items vii–x), and conclude
with active roles (item xi).
(i) A protocol theory was deﬁned in [8,9] as a collection of rules for which
the graph generated by their role state predicates was acyclic (see item x
below for further details). Each connected component corresponded to
a role. Besides this constraint, the rules within a role were indepen-
dent. This aspect is mostly maintained in our current formulation, but
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our deﬁnition of role allow threading rules by using role state predicate
declarations as a sequencing device. This option is seldom used since
this eﬀect can be achieved more simply by appropriately using role state
predicates.
(ii) In [8,9], all variables were implicitly universally quantiﬁed at the head of
a rule, unless marked in the consequent as fresh data. Here, these vari-
ables are explicitly introduced by typed universal quantiﬁers. Explicit
quantiﬁcation simpliﬁes rule analysis as far as type-checking [4] and ac-
cess control [3] are concerned. More importantly, it declares the type of
variables, which is necessary for the correct execution of a protocol (more
on this aspect in 5).
(iii) The only quantiﬁers present in [8,9] appeared in rule consequents and had
the purpose of introducing variables to be instantiated with fresh data.
The adoption of dependent types makes this mechanism more powerful.
Our current schema allows for example a server to generate a key to be
shared among two speciﬁc principals.
(iv) As already observed, our current formulation does not make use of the
persistent predicates of [8,9]. As we said, the information once conveyed
by these objects is not entirely captured within the type system of MSR.
(v) Memory predicates are a novel feature. As already mentioned, they are
useful whenever data should be remembered across role executions, which
happens, for example, when a subprotocol can be executed repeatedly
after some initialization phase.
(vi) Any number of network predicates can appear in both the antecedent and
the consequent of a rule. The original deﬁnition allowed at most once
such predicate per rule, either in the left-hand side (in “receive” rules),
or in the right-hand side (for “send” rules). Denker et al. [12] showed
that, whenever some simple conditions are met, a sequence of contiguous
message reception rules followed by a sequence of contiguous transmission
rules can be soundly collapsed into a single rule of the proposed form.
This is clearly a conservative extension of our previous proposal. Besides
reducing the length of the speciﬁcation of a protocol, the practical value
of merging rules lies in the fact that it yields a huge overhead reduction
when model-checking a protocol.
(vii) In [8,9], each rule contained exactly one role state predicate on each
side, with the exception of the single “role generation rule” that acti-
vated the role. The productions above instead allow zero, one, or several
such predicates on either side. This deﬁnition simpliﬁes the grammatical
speciﬁcation of roles. However, we will make a very limited use of this
added expressive power. Having more than one role state predicate in
the left-hand or right-hand side of a rule does not appear particularly
useful since the arguments of these predicates collect data known to a
principal in the current thread of execution of a role. The antecedent of
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the ﬁrst rule in a role cannot sensibly mention any role state predicate
since its left-hand side could not match any state. The antecedent of
the other rules typically will have such a predicate for synchronization,
although this is not enforced. For the same reason, the consequent of a
rule will generally contain a role state predicate. The natural exception
to this practice regards the ﬁnal rules of a role, which do not need to
make provisions for further synchronization.
(viii) The role state predicate symbols allowed in [8,9] were constants rather
than variables. We now prefer to make them unique to each instantiation
of a rule in order to avoid the possibility of interferences (although we
have no examples in which such a phenomenon is harmful).
(ix) With the exception of [7], our previous work did not refer to any argu-
ment of a role state predicate as a distinguished role owner. These early
versions of MSR did not need to actively rely on role owners to fulﬁll
their objectives, i.e. studying the decidability of discovering attacks in
a protocol. Therefore, no particular emphasis was given to this notion.
This information becomes crucial when trying to enforce access control,
as described in [3].
(x) For any given role, it is interesting to study the graph whose nodes are
its role state predicates and whose edges link the predicate occurring in
the left-hand side to the predicate in the right-hand side of each rule.
In [8,9,6] we required that this graph be an upper semi-lattice, and in
particular that it had a single entry point and be acyclic. This was a
crucial assumption for studying the complexity of protocols [8,15]. Here,
we drop this condition from the syntax of a role, but our ﬁring rules will
de facto implement a similar constraint at execution time.
(xi) Our previous work [8,9] did not have a notion of active role: since
role state predicate symbols were constants, rules could not be threaded
within a role and each rule was necessarily an independent object that
could be applied whenever its antecedent matched the current state. The
more complex pattern proposed in this chapter require memorizing which
roles are in current use, and how they are instantiated. This is the pur-
pose of active role sets. It must be observed that these entities are closely
related to the notions of residual strands studied in [9] as a part of an
execution model for strand speciﬁcations of security protocols [16].
5 Protocol Execution
In this section, we will deﬁne the execution model of MSR. More precisely, we
ﬁrst outline the deﬁnition of the pervasive notion of substitution in Section 5.1.
Then, we present the basic one-step rule application and its sequential itera-
tion in Section 5.2. In Section 5.3, we extend this notion to allow concurrent
rule ﬁring. We prove the admissibility of parallel ﬁring in Section 5.4. We
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conclude in Section 5.5 with a discussion of the main changes with respect to
previous versions of MSR.
5.1 Substitutions
In this section, we introduce the notion of substitution used in the execution
rules below. We focus mainly on the syntax of this operation. Its fairly
standard deﬁnition is displayed in Appendix A.3.
Given a variable x and an object O that may mention x as a parameter,
we denote the substitution of a term t for x in O as [t/x]O. As far as the
execution rules are concerned, the instantiating term t will always be ground,
and therefore the implementation of substitution does not need to take par-
ticular provisions aimed at avoiding variable capture (i.e. the risk that a free
variable in t may accidentally become bound in O). The parametric objects O
we will be interested in are other terms t′, term tuples t, types τ , type tuples
τ , predicate sequences lhs , right-hand sides rhs, rules r, and rule collections
ρ. All together, we will encounter the following forms of substitution:
[t/x]t′ [t/x]t [t/x]τ [t/x]τ [t/x]lhs [t/x]rhs [t/x]r [t/x]ρ
Observe that, for simplicity, we are overloading the bracket notation to denote
the application of the substitution operation to objects belonging to diﬀerent
syntactic categories. We only need to deﬁne the substitution of t for x in
objects that may mention x as a free variable. This is why we do not include
protocol theories, states and active roles in the above list.
Besides term variables, rule collections contain a second kind of parameter,
namely role state predicate symbols, that we have denoted with the letter L,
variously decorated. During execution, we will need to instantiate them to
constants of the form Ll, where l is a label. We extend our syntax and write
[Ll/L]O for the substitution of variable L with Ll in object O. This operation
applies to left-hand sides lhs , consequents rhs, rules r and rule collections ρ:
[Ll/L]lhs [Ll/L]rhs [Ll/L]r [Ll/L]ρ
It should be observed that although L stands for a predicate symbol, it never
needs to be instantiated to anything more complex than a constant. The
higher-orderness of our notation is only apparent.
Again, the deﬁnition of these operations can be found in Appendix A.3.
5.2 Sequential Firing
Execution is concerned with the use of a protocol theory to move from a
situation described by a state S to another situation modeled by a state S ′.
In this section, we will introduce judgments and rules describing the atomic
execution steps that lead from S to S ′. We will then show how they can be
chained to perform multi-rule sequential applications.
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Referring to the situation that the execution of a protocol has reached by
means of a state is an oversimpliﬁcation. Two more ingredients are required:
ﬁrst we need to know which roles can be used in order to continue the ex-
ecution, at which point they were stopped, and how they were instantiated.
This calls for an active role set. Second, it is very convenient to carry around
a list of the constants in use in a signature: this allows us in particular to
verify that instantiations are well-formed and well-typed. Situations are then
formally deﬁned as a triple consisting of a state S, an active role set R and a
signature Σ. Such triples are called snapshots, and denoted as in the following
grammatical production:
Snapshot: C ::= [S]RΣ
We shall observe that no element in a snapshot contains free variables: Σ
is clearly ground, and so is the state S; the active role set R will generally
contain bound variables, but execution will always instantiate them to ground
terms as it exposes them.
Given a protocol P , we describe the fact that execution transforms a snap-
shot C into another snapshot C ′ in one step by means of the following judg-
ment, where we have expanded the deﬁnition of C and C ′ to familiarize the
reader:
P  [S]RΣ −→ [S ′]R′Σ′ One-step sequential ﬁring
This judgment is implemented by the next six rules that fall into three classes.
We should be able to: ﬁrst, make a role from P available for execution; second,
perform instantiations and apply a rule; and third, skip rules (more on this
later).
We ﬁrst examine how to extend the current active role set R with a role
taken from the protocol speciﬁcation P . As deﬁned in Section 4.3, P can
contain both anchored roles ρA and generic roles ρ∀A. This yields the following
two rules, respectively:
exs arole
(P , ρA)  [S]RΣ −→ [S]R,ρ
A
Σ
Σ  A : principal
exs grole
(P , ρ∀A)  [S]RΣ −→ [S]R,([A/A]ρ)
A
Σ
Anchored roles can simply be copied to the current active role sets since their
syntax meets the requirements for active roles. In order to make a generic
role available for execution, we must assign it an owner. The premise of
rule exs grole selects a principal name A from the current signature Σ and
instantiates ρ with it. Observe that this premise relies the typing judgment to
make sure that A is deﬁned and that it actually stands for a principal name.
We could have alternatively looked it up in Σ directly.
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Once a role has been activated by either of the above rules, chances are
that it contains role state predicate parameter declarations that require to be
instantiated with actual constants before any of the embedded rules can be
applied. This situation, characterized by the fact that the active role under
examination has the form (∃L : τ . ρ)A, is implemented by the following rule,
which generates a fresh constant Ll, adds a declaration for it in the current
signature Σ, and replaces every occurrence of L in ρ with it. Notice that
Ll shall be a new symbol that appears nowhere in the current snapshot (in
particular it should not occur in Σ).
exs rsp
P  [S]R,(∃L:τ. ρ)AΣ −→ [S]R,([Ll/L]ρ)
A
(Σ,Ll:τ)
Processing a role state predicate parameter declaration preﬁx may have
the eﬀect of exposing a protocol rule r. At this point, r can participate in an
atomic execution step in two ways: we can either skip it (discuss below), or
we can apply it to the current snapshot to obtain a new conﬁguration. The
latter option is implemented by the inference rule below, which makes use
of the rule application judgment “r  [S]Σ  [S ′]Σ′” to construct the state
S ′ and the signature Σ′ resulting from the application. We will describe this
judgment shortly. The changes to the active role set are limited to discarding
the used rule r.
r  [S]Σ  [S′]Σ′
exs rule
P  [S]R,(r,ρ)AΣ −→ [S ′]R,(ρ)
A
Σ′
Only the simplest of security protocols specify a purely linear sequence of
actions. More complex systems allow various forms of branching or even more
complex layouts. In a protocol theory, the control structure is mostly realized
by the role state predicates appearing in a role. Branching can be modeled by
having two rules share the same role state predicate parameter in their left-
hand side. Roles, on the other hand, are deﬁned as a linear collection of rules.
Therefore, in order to access alternative role continuations, we may need to
skip a rule, i.e. discard it and continue with the rest of the speciﬁcation. The
following two execution rules implement this scenario:
exs skp
P  [S]R,(r,ρ)AΣ −→ [S]R,(ρ)
A
Σ
exs dot
P  [S]R,(·)AΣ −→ [S]RΣ
The inference on the left skips a protocol rule. Rule exs dot does some house-
keeping by throwing away active roles that have been completely executed.
When successful, the application of a rule r to a state S in the signature
Σ produces an updated state S ′ deﬁned in the extended signature Σ′. This
operation is deﬁned by the following judgment:
r  [S]Σ  [S′]Σ′ Rule application
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It is implemented by two rules that discriminate on the structure of a protocol
rule.
In order to apply a rule to the current state, we ﬁrst need to appropriately
instantiate the universal variables that may appear in it. Our next execution
rule will therefore examine rules of the form (∀x : τ. r). It instantiates x to
some well-formed term t of type τ in the current signature:
Σ  t : τ [t/x]r  [S]Σ  [S ′]Σ′
exs all
(∀x : τ. r)  [S]Σ  [S′]Σ′
Again, we make use of the typing judgment to ascertain that t has type τ in
Σ. The attentive reader may be concerned by the fact that the construction of
the instantiating term t is not guided by the contents of the state S. This is a
very legitimate observation: the rule above provides an idealized model of the
execution rather than the basis for the implementation of an actual simulator.
We may want to think of the premise of this rule as a non-deterministic oracle
that will construct the “right” term to successfully continue the execution. An
operational model suited for implementation is the subject of current research.
We now consider execution steps resulting from the application of a fully
instantiated rule of the form “lhs → rhs”. The antecedent lhs must be ground
and therefore it has the structure of a legal state. This rule identiﬁes lhs in the
current state and replaces it with a substate lhs ′ derived from the consequent
rhs . This latter operation is performed in the premise of this rule by the right-
hand side instantiation judgment “(rhs)Σ  (lhs ′)Σ′” that will be discussed
shortly.
(rhs)Σ  (lhs ′)Σ′
exs core
(lhs → rhs)  [S, lhs ]Σ  [S, lhs ′]Σ′
The right-hand side instantiation judgment used in the premise of rule
exs core generates a ground predicate sequence lhs from the consequent rhs
of a fully instantiated rule r from an active role (r, ρ)A. The resulting changes
to the current signature Σ are reﬂected in the updated signature Σ′. This
judgment is deﬁned as follows:
(rhs)Σ  (lhs)Σ′ Right-hand side instantiation
It is implemented by the following two rules, which instantiate the existentially
quantiﬁed variables possibly wrapped around the core of rhs. If this parameter
is already a predicate sequence, we simply return it, without making any
change to the signature Σ:
exs seq
(lhs)Σ  (lhs)Σ
The instantiation of an existentially quantiﬁed term variable x is handled in
rule exs nnc below. We generate a fresh term constant a of the appropriate
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type, records this fact in the signature, and replaces every occurrence of x
with a before examining the body of rhs.
([a/x]rhs)(Σ,a:τ)  (lhs)Σ′
exs nnc
(∃x : τ. rhs)Σ  (lhs)Σ′
Observe that, in this rule, the generated constants should not appear anywhere
in the current signature Σ (and therefore in the left-hand side of the judgment):
this object is new.
We conclude this section by providing a judgment and the associated in-
ference rules that allow us to chain the atomic steps presented above into
multi-step sequential ﬁrings. This allows simulating executions consisting of
the linear application of any number of basic steps between two snapshots of
interest. We have the following judgment:
P  C −→∗ C ′ Multi-step sequential ﬁring
The following rules deﬁne this judgment as the reﬂexive and transitive closure
of the atomic step relation discussed above.
exs it0
P  C −→∗ C
P  C −→ C ′ P  C ′ −→∗ C ′′
exs itn
P  C −→∗ C ′′
We conclude this section with a simple lemma that asserts that, as execu-
tion proceeds, the initial signature can only be extended. As a space saver,
we write P  C −→(∗) C ′ to indicate that we are considering the one-step
(P  C −→ C ′) and the multi-step (P  C −→∗ C ′) versions of the sequential
ﬁring judgment at once.
Lemma 5.1 (Signature Extension)
Let Σ and Σ′ be signatures, rhs the right-hand side of a rule, lhs a predicate
sequence, r a rule, S and S′ states, P a protocol theory, and R and R′ active
role sets.
(i) If (rhs)Σ  (lhs)Σ′, then Σ′ = (Σ,Σ′′) for some signature Σ′′.
(ii) If r  [S]Σ  [S′]Σ′, then Σ′ = (Σ,Σ′′) for some signature Σ′′.
(iii) If P  [S]RΣ −→(∗) [S ′]R′Σ′ , then Σ′ = (Σ,Σ′′) for some signature Σ′′.
Proof: The proof proceeds by induction on the structure of a derivation of
the judgments in each of the three parts of this lemma. These results are
not mutually recursive and shall be proved in the given order. We present
only a sketch of this very simple proof, reserving a detailed illustration of the
technique used for more substantial examples in the sequel.
The ﬁrst result (1) is immediate for rule exs seq and follows by an ap-
peal to the induction hypothesis for rule exs nnc. The second point in this
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lemma (2) relies on (1) for rule exs core and the indurction hypothesis for
rule exs all. The last result (3), is immediate for rules exs arole, exs grole,
exs rsp, exs skp, exs dot, and exs it0. It relies on (2) for rule exs rule and
follows by induction for rule exs itn. ✷
5.3 Parallel Firing
Multi-step sequential ﬁring simulates the execution of a protocol one rule at a
time. However, even the simplest of protocols are inherently concurrent sys-
tems and allow independent roles to be executing at the same time. Although
interleaving permits reducing such a behavior to the sequential case, it is in-
teresting to provide a direct speciﬁcation of this model. In this section, we
will ﬁrst discuss executions that can be obtained as the parallel composition of
one-step sequential ﬁrings, and then generalize it to multi-step parallel ﬁring.
In Section 5.4, we will establish a formal relationship between the sequential
and parallel models of execution.
We will rely on the following judgment to express the fact that snapshot
C ′ is obtained from C by executing zero or more atomic steps in parallel:
P  C =⇒ C ′ One-step parallel ﬁring
The two rules below implement this judgment. The toptmost inference cap-
tures the degenerate situation where no basic step is applied: the current
snapshot is returned as output. Rule exp par expresses parallel execution:
intuitively, we want to partition the current state description into partial snap-
shots, independently apply one basic step to each, and then merge the results
together to obtain the output snapshot.
exp id
P  C =⇒ C
P  [S1]R1Σ −→ [S ′1]R
′
1
(Σ,Σ′1)
P  [S2]R2Σ =⇒ [S ′2]R
′
2
(Σ,Σ′2)
exp par
P  [S1, S2] (R1,R2)Σ =⇒ [S ′1, S ′2] (R
′
1,R
′
2)
(Σ,Σ′1,Σ
′
2)
Technically, rule exp par operates as follows: it splits the current state in two
parts S1 and S2, and similarly partitions the active role set into R1 and R2.
The left premise applies one atomic execution step to the partial snapshot
[S1]
R1
Σ , producing [S
′
1]
R′1
(Σ,Σ′1)
as a result, where Σ′1 is the amount by which the
current signature Σ has been extended during this step. Rather than having an
unbounded number of premises, we call our parallel ﬁring judgment recursively
in the rightmost premise: in zero or more atomic steps, we transform the
remainder of the initial snapshot, [S2]
R2
Σ , into [S
′
2]
R′2
(Σ,Σ′2)
where again Σ′2 is the
resulting signature extension. The overall output snapshot is constructed by
taking the multiset union of the returned states S ′1 and S
′
2, juxtaposing the
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output active role sets R′1 and R
′
2, and combining the resulting signatures
(Σ,Σ′1) and (Σ,Σ
′
2) into (Σ,Σ
′
1,Σ
′
2).
It should be noted that the input snapshots to the premises of rule exp par
have no state element or active role in common: they are independent. They
both rely on the same signature Σ since unrelated state objects and active
roles may in general refer to the same constants. The application of a basic
step can at most extend the initial signature Σ (see the Signature Extension
Lemma 5.1 and Lemma 5.2 below), which justiﬁes expressing the signature
output by the two premises as (Σ,Σi), for i = 1, 2. We can always choose the
newly generated names so that Σ1 and Σ2 do not declare the same constant:
under this assumption, (Σ,Σ1,Σ2) is structurally a well-formed signature.
The last judgment we will consider iterates one-step parallel ﬁrings. It is
expressed as follows:
P  C =⇒∗ C ′ Multi-step parallel ﬁring
Similarly to multi-step sequential ﬁring, it is obtained by taking the reﬂexive
and transitive closure of its one-step restriction:
exp it0
P  C =⇒∗ C
P  C =⇒ C ′ P  C ′ =⇒∗ C ′′
exp itn
P  C =⇒∗ C ′′
We now extend the Signature Extension Lemma 5.1 to parallel ﬁring.
Again, we write P  C =⇒(∗) C ′ to indicate that we are considering the
one-step (P  C =⇒ C ′) and the multi-step (P  C =⇒∗ C ′) versions of the
parallel ﬁring judgment at once.
Lemma 5.2 (Signature Extension)
Let Σ and Σ′ be signatures, P a protocol theory, S and S ′ states, and R
and R′ active role sets. If P  [S]RΣ =⇒(∗) [S ′]R′Σ′ , then Σ′ = (Σ,Σ′′) for
some signature Σ′′.
Proof: This result is proved by induction hypothesis on the given premise. An
appeal to Lemma 5.1(2) and to the induction hypothesis is needed to justify
the form of the premises of rule exp par. ✷
5.4 Admissibility of Parallel Firing
We now turn to proving that parallel ﬁring can be emulated by sequential
execution. The proof of this property relies on a number of simple lemmas, the
ﬁrst of which, given below, states that term typing is invariant with respect
to weakening: if a term is typable in a signature, it remains typable when
considering additional declarations.
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Lemma 5.3 (Weakening Term Typing)
Let (Σ,Σ′′) be a signature, t a term and τ a type. If (Σ,Σ′′)  t : τ ,
then (Σ,Σ′,Σ′′)  t : τ for any signature Σ′.
Proof: The proof proceeds by induction on the structure of a derivation T
of the given judgment. It is uncondionally valid when the last (and only) rule
of T is mpt a. It relies on immediate appeals to the induction hypothesis in
the other cases (rules mtp ss, mtp cnc, mtp ske and mtp pke). ✷
We now come to the central lemma in the proof of the admissibility of the
rules for parallel ﬁring. It asserts that not only signatures, but also states and
active role sets can be weakened in an execution judgment, without inﬂuencing
its derivability. The ﬁrst result in this lemma is needed in the proof of the
remaining two.
Lemma 5.4 (Weakening Execution)
Let Σ and Σ′′ be signatures, rhs the right-hand side of a rule, lhs a predicate
sequence, P be a protocol theory, S and S ′′ states, and R and R′′ active role
sets. For any signature Σ′, state S ′ and active role set R′,
(i) if (rhs)Σ  (lhs)Σ,Σ′′, then (rhs)Σ,Σ′  (lhs)Σ,Σ′,Σ′′.
(ii) if P  [S]RΣ −→(∗) [S ′′]R′′Σ,Σ′′, then P  [S, S ′]R,R
′
Σ,Σ′ −→(∗) [S ′, S ′′]R
′,R′′
Σ,Σ′,Σ′′.
(iii) if P  [S]RΣ =⇒(∗) [S ′′]R′′Σ,Σ′′, then P  [S, S ′]R,R
′
Σ,Σ′ =⇒(∗) [S ′, S ′′]R
′,R′′
Σ,Σ′,Σ′′.
Proof: We proceed by induction on the structure of a derivation for the
antecedent of each result. In (1), the property is immediate for rule exs seq
and is obained by application of the induction hypothesis for rule exs nnc.
We proceed similarly in the case of (2), except that we make use of (1) for
rule exs rule and of Lemma 5.3 for rules exs grole and exs all. The treatment
of (3) is again similar: it should be noted that the state and active role sets
extensions (S ′ and R′ respectively) can be split arbitrarily in the premises of
rule exp par. ✷
We can now prove our admissibility result: an arbitrary parallel execution
can be simulated by sequential ﬁring sequences. Unsurprisingly, the reverse
of this property holds as well: any sequential execution can be lifted to a
(degenerate) form of parallel ﬁring.
Theorem 5.5 (Admissibility of Parallel Execution)
Let P be a protocol theory, and C and C ′ two snapshots. If PC =⇒(∗) C ′,
then P C −→∗ C ′. Viceversa, if P C −→(∗) C ′, then P C =⇒(∗) C ′.
Proof: In its forward direction, the proof of this result proceeds by induction
on the structure of a given derivation E of the judgment P  C =⇒(∗) C ′.
We will examine the one-step case in detail, but omit the simple proof of its
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multi-step extension. We proceed by cases on the last rule of E : for single-step
parallel ﬁring, only rules exp id and exp par need to be considered.
exp id E = exp id
P  C =⇒ C
with C ′ = C.
The result is obtained by instantiating rule exs it0 with the same param-
eters.
exp par E =
E1
P  [S1]R1Σ −→ [S ′1]R
′
1
Σ,Σ′1
E2
P  [S2]R2Σ =⇒ [S ′2]R
′
2
Σ,Σ′2
exp par
P  [S1, S2]R1,R2Σ =⇒ [S ′1, S ′2]R
′
1,R
′
2
Σ,Σ′1,Σ
′
2
with C = [S1, S2]
R1,R2
Σ and C
′ = [S ′1, S
′
2]
R′1,R
′
2
Σ,Σ′1,Σ
′
2
.
The proof of this case consists of the following transformations, where the
ﬁrst column gives a name to the derivation of the judgment in the second
column:
E ′1 :: P  [S1, S2]R1,R2Σ −→ [S ′1, S2]R
′
1,R2
(Σ,Σ′1)
by the Weakening Lemma 5.4(2)
on E1,
E∗2 :: P  [S2]R2Σ −→∗ [S ′2]R
′
2
(Σ,Σ′2)
by induction hypothesis on E2,
E ′2 :: P[S ′1, S2]R
′
1,R2
Σ,Σ′1
−→∗ [S ′1, S ′2]R
′
1,R
′
2
(Σ,Σ′1,Σ
′
2)
by the Weakening Lemma 5.4(3)
on E∗2 ,
E ′ :: P[S1, S2]R1,R2Σ −→∗ [S ′1, S ′2]R
′
1,R
′
2
(Σ,Σ′1,Σ
′
2)
by rule exs itn on E ′1 and E ′2.
Observe that a single-step parallel ﬁring is mapped to a multi-step sequential
execution. The multi-step parallel case builds on the result we just proved
and is obtained by a simple induction on the derivation E .
The reverse direction of this theorem is proved as follows: we wrap each
one-step sequential ﬁring with one application of rule exp par by means of an
instance of rule exp id with empty state and active role set. The multi-step
case mimicks the corresponding sequential construction with parallel iteration
rules. ✷
It should be observed that this proof does not operate directly on the rules
that implement the one-step sequential execution judgment. Therefore, this
relation can be altered at will without invalidating this theorem, as long as
Lemma 5.4 still holds.
This result allows us to focus our eﬀorts on the rules for sequential exe-
cution: any property proved valid for the sequential case can immediately be
ported to the parallel setting by using the appropriate direction of the above
theorem. This does not mean, however, that we should do without parallel
execution and eliminate its rules from our formalization: this form of execu-
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tion is more faithful to the behavior of protocols in a distributed environment
and therefore constitutes a more adequate model of their execution. The fact
that parallel execution can be serialized does not imply that the resulting
sequential behavior is better and should be adopted.
5.5 Changes
As done at the end of the previous major subdivisions of this paper, we con-
clude this section with a discussions of the changes in the execution seman-
tics of MSR with respect to previous versions of this formalism, as presented
in [8,9].
(i) In our previous work, the basic execution step of MSR consisted in the
application of a protocol rule: instantiation of the variables appearing in
its left-hand side happened by pattern matching with the current state,
fresh constants were substituted for the existential parameters in its con-
sequent and any additional variable was instantiated before installing
the resulting right-hand side back into the state. Since rules were not
threaded, there was no need to load an active role set before execut-
ing them, nor was there any point in “skipping” a rule. The execution
model discussed in this paper has clearly a ﬁner grain. This is due to
two reasons: on the one hand, our more detailed speciﬁcation calls for
a precise description of how execution actually happens. In particular,
we make the instantiation of each variable individually observable (rule
exs all) and separate this process from the actual application of a rule
(rule exs rule). On the other hand, special provisions are required to
handle some novelties of our syntax, in particular the possible threading
of protocol rules in a role (rule exs skp), the presence of a distinguished
role owner (rules exs arole and exs grole), and the notion of active role
(rule exs dot).
(ii) In [8,9], the universal variables (then implicitly quantiﬁed) were instan-
tiated by pattern matching at the time a rule was applied. Our current
model is apparently more non-deterministic in that it relies on some guess
work to instantiated these objects before the current state is accessed. As
already said, this model is purposefully abstract and not intended as the
basis for an implementation. We should however observe that [8,9] did
not discuss how variables that appear only in the consequent of a rule
ought to be instantiated, while our current proposal treats them trans-
parently. This is the subject of future work.
(iii) As mentioned in Section 4, our earlier work on MSR demanded that the
graph obtained by chasing the role state predicate names in a speciﬁca-
tion be acyclic. This eliminated the possibility of roles executions that
required an unbounded number of steps, a major simpliﬁcation in the
proofs of the decidability results of [8,15]. Our present syntax admits
roles where the corresponding graphs contain cycles. It should however
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be noted that our execution model prevents taking advantage of them to
implement a looping behavior: parametricity makes role state predicates
unique to each individual invocation of a role. The rules in an active role,
which realize this property, are however processed sequentially without
any possibility of jumping back. Still, iteration is possible inMSR thanks
to the introduction of memory predicates. This will be demonstrated in
Section 6.
(iv) In the previous versions of MSR, the notion of execution was limited to
sequential ﬁring of rules. Parallel execution is therefore a novelty of this
paper.
6 Intruder Models
In this section, we will demonstrate the expressive power of MSR by formaliz-
ing what has come to be accepted as the standard abstraction of the attacker:
the Dolev-Yao intruder [20,14]. More precisely, we deﬁne the Dolev-Yao ab-
straction and the natural intruder model it induces in Section 6.1. We then
provide a direct MSR encoding in Section 6.2. We conclude in Section 6.3 by
presenting an optimized variant of the Dolev-Yao intruder model and hinting
at its correctness.
Diﬀerently from what happens when specifying actual security protocols,
all the roles we will need in this paper consist of a single rule. We will represent
a role using the format in the following diagram, where we ﬁnd it convenient
to list the elements of its four blocks in columns.

 Universalquantiﬁers
Left-hand
side
→ Existential
quantiﬁers
Right-hand
side


Owner
We will mark types that can be reconstructed from the other information
present in a rule by denoting them in a shaded font. We will provide informal
reasons in support of these elision, but we reserve a formal treatment of type
reconstruction in the context of MSR to a future publication.
6.1 The Dolev-Yao Intruder Model
The Dolev-Yao abstraction of a crypto-protocol appears to be drawn from po-
sitions taken in [20] and from a simpliﬁed model presented in [14]. It assumes
that such elementary data as principal names, keys and nonces are atomic
rather than strings of bits, as implemented in practice. Furthermore, it views
the operations needed to assemble messages, i.e. concatenation, encryption
and digital signature, as pure constructors in an initial algebra. Therefore, if
n is a nonce and k a key, {n}k is a composite object whose structure is clearly
recognizable. This means for example that a term of the form {t}k cannot be
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mistaken for a concatenation (t1 t2), and that {t}k = {t′}k′ if and only if t = t′
and k = k′. This also means that the Dolev-Yao model abstracts away the
details of the cryptographic algorithms in use, reducing in this way encryption
and decryption to atomic operations. Indeed, it is often said to adopt a black
box view on cryptography.
The atomicity and initiality of the Dolev-Yao abstraction limits consider-
ably the attacks that can be mounted against a protocol. In particular, its
idealized encryption model makes it immune to any form of crypto-analysis:
keys cannot be exhaustively searched, piecewise inferred from observed traf-
ﬁc, or guessed in any other manner. An encrypted message can be deciphered
only when in possession of the appropriate key. The symbolic nature of this
abstraction allows then to very precisely circumscribe the operations an in-
truder has at his disposal to enact an attack against a protocol. All together,
they deﬁne what has become to be known as the Dolev-Yao intruder. This
attacker can do any combination of the following eight operations that we ﬁnd
convenient to organize in the ﬁve lines below:
• Intercept and learn messages
• Decompose concatenated messages
he has learnt
• Decipher encrypted messages if he
knows the keys
• Transmit known messages
• Concatenate known messages
• Encrypt known messages with
known keys
• Access public information
• Generate fresh data
The ﬁrst line implies that the Dolev-Yao intruder has complete control of the
network. This is clearly a worst case scenario.
MSR is a clear instance of the the Dolev-Yao abstraction. Elementary data
are indeed atomic, message are constructed by applying symbolic operators,
and the criterion for identifying terms is plain syntactic equality. We will now
give a speciﬁcation of the Dolev-Yao intruder in MSR. More speciﬁcally, we
describe the attacker discussed above in this section. In Section 6.3, we will
give an encoding to an optimized version of this attacker proposed in [19] and
formalized using a previous version of MSR in [8].
6.2 An MSR Speciﬁcation of the Dolev-Yao Intruder
It has been proved that there is no advantage in considering more than one
Dolev-Yao adversary in any given system [23]. Therefore, we select a principal,
I say, and endow him with the powers of the Dolev-Yao intruder.
Since the intruder can learn and manipulate information, he must be able
to store data out of sight from other principals. This is easily achieved in
MSR by associating I with a memory predicate MI( ) whose single argument
can hold a message. A signature for this model must therefore contain the
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following two declarations:
I : principal and M : principal×msg
On the basis of this declarations, we will express each of the intruder’s capabil-
ities as one or more roles consisting of a single rule. Each of these roles will be
anchored at I and altogether model the actions that the Dolev-Yao intruder
can undertake to mount an attack. Thus, the knowledge of the intruder is
represented in a distributed fashion as a collection of memory predicates of
the form MI(t) for all known terms t.
The ﬁrst line of the description of the Dolev-Yao intruder is then expressed
by the following two roles, anchored on I. With the rule on the left, the in-
truder can capture a network message N(t) and store its contents in a memory
predicate. Observe that the execution semantics of MSR implies that N(t) is
removed from the current state and therefore this message is not available any
more to the principal it was supposed to reach. The rule on the right emits a
memorized message out in the public network.
(∀t : msg. N(t) → MI(t))I (∀t : msg. MI(t) → N(t))I
From now on, we will only be concerned with the memory predicate MI,
which acts as a workshop where the intruder can dismantle intercepted com-
munications and counterfeit messages. Concatenated messages do not oﬀer
any barrier to the intruder: he can take them apart at will. Similarly he can
construct the concatenation of any two messages he knows. This is realized
by the following two rules:
(
∀t1, t2 : msg. MI(t1 t2) → MI(t1)MI(t2)
)I
(
∀t1, t2 : msg. MI(t1)MI(t2) → MI(t1 t2)
)I
The third line of the speciﬁcation of the Dolev-Yao intruder, at the begin-
ning of this section, states that I must know the appropriate decryption keys
in order to access the contents of an encrypted message. Dually, he must be
in possess of the correct key in order to perform an encryption. The following
two rules formalize this requirement inMSR in the case of shared-key codings:

∀A,B : principal.∀k : shK A B.
∀t : msg.
MI({t}k)
MI(k)
→ MI(t)


I

∀A,B : principal.∀k : shK A B.
∀t : msg.
MI(t)
MI(k)
→ MI({t}k)


I
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Both for taking apart and constructing a shared-key encrypted message, the
intruder must know the key. Observe that most typing information can be
inferred assuming that the speciﬁcation at hand it well-typed [4]. Take for
example the role on the left. In order for the message {t}k to be well-formed,
k must be a shared key between two principals. Thus its type must be shKAB
and the type of the dependent arguments A and B has to be principal. An
algorithmic description of how type reconstruction is performed is the subject
of future work.
The treatment of public-key cryptography is similar. Notice that here the
intruder must have access to a private key for decrypting, while the public key
is suﬃcient for generating encrypted messages.


∀A : principal.
∀k: pubK A.
∀k′ : privK k.
∀t : msg.
MI({ t} k)
MI(k
′)
→ MI(t)


I

∀A : principal.∀k : pubK A.
∀t : msg.
MI(t)
MI(k)
→ MI({ t} k)


I
Again, most typing information can be reconstructed on the base of the struc-
ture of the terms present in this rule. The reasoning proceeds as in the case
of shared keys.
We now tackle the often overlooked fourth line of the Dolev-Yao intruder
speciﬁcation above: the ability to access public information. He should clearly
be entitled to look up the name and public keys of principals, but any at-
tempted access to more sensitive information such as private keys should be
forbidden. The clear exception to this rule consists of the keys he is indepen-
dently entitled to look up, namely his own private key and keys he shares with
other principals. This situation is therefore implemented by the following ﬁve
rules: (∀A : principal. · → MI(A))I
(∀A : principal.
∀k : shK I A. · → MI(k)
)I (∀A : principal.
∀k : shK A I. · → MI(k)
)I
(∀A : principal.
∀k : pubK A. · → MI(k)
)I (∀k : pubK I.
∀k′ : privK k. · → MI(k
′)
)I
It should be observed that there is a close connection between these rules
and the access control policy induced by the term language at hand [3]. In
particular, the capabilities of the intruder with respect to public information
access always correspond to the strongest rules that satisfy the access control
policy.
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The last line of the speciﬁcation of the Dolev-Yao intruder hints at the fact
that he should be able to create fresh data. We must be very careful when
implementing this requirement: in most scenarios, it is inappropriate for I to
generate a shared key k∗ between two principals A and B since this would result
in unwanted trivial attacks where A and B use k∗ instead of their legitimate
shared key kAB (this would be very close to permitting the intruder to guess
keys). In general, we do not allow the intruder to generate keys. Similarly, the
adversary should not be entitled to create new principals. Nonces and atomic
messages are instead risk-frees. Therefore, we propose the following two rules:
( · → ∃n : nonce. MI(n))I ( · → ∃m : atm. MI(m))I
Observe that the rationale behind these two rules, although reasonable, may
conﬂict with idiosyncrasies of individual protocols. For example, the full ver-
sion of the Needham-Schroeder protocol speciﬁed in [4] may be more accu-
rately validated in the presence of an intruder who can create public keys
(but not the corresponding private keys). Therefore, depending on the proto-
col at hand, any of the following rules may be included in the speciﬁcation of
the Dolev-Yao intruder:
(∀A,B : principal. · → ∃k : shK A B. MI(k))I(∀A: principal. · → ∃k : pubK A. MI(k))I(∀A : principal.
∀k: pubK A. · → ∃k
′ : privK k. MI(k′)
)I
A similar rule for principals seems harder to justify since protocols never
generate principals, at least not in the simple setting contemplated in this
paper.
We provide our formalization of the Dolev-Yao intruder with two admin-
istrative rules to allow him to take full advantage of the above stated capabil-
ities. The rule below on the left allows him to forget information. The more
interesting rule on the right permits duplicating and reusing fabricated data.
(∀t : msg. MI(t) → ·)I
(
∀t : msg. MI(t) → MI(t)MI(t)
)I
Last, we have two seldom needed rule schemata that allow the intruder
to shuﬄe data between the knowledge predicate MI( ) used above and other
memory predicates he may have. It is in general unnecessary for the standard
Dolev-Yao intruder to rely on additional memory predicates. Here, we write
M ′I for a generic intruder memory predicate with n + 1 arguments. We have
the following role patterns, where i is an index between 2 and n+ 1:

∀t1 : τ1.· · ·
∀tn : τn.
M ′I (t1, . . . , tn) → M
′
I (t1, . . . , tn)
MI(ti)


I
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

∀t1 : τ1.
· · ·
∀tn : τn.
∀t′i : τi.
M ′I (t1, . . . , tn)
MI(t
′
i)
→ M ′I (t1, . . . , t′i, . . . , tn)


I
The rule on the right replaces the argument ti of the memory predicate on its
antecedent with t′i in its consequent.
This concludes the MSR formalization of the Dolev-Yao intruder. A few
aspects of this encoding deserve to be emphasized:
(i) This speciﬁcation lies fully within MSR and can therefore be adapted,
were the protocol at hand to require it. This diﬀers from many speciﬁ-
cation languages which either hardwire the intruder, or express him in
a language diﬀerent from the protocol under examination. It should be
observed that our previous version of MSR belonged to this latter class:
although the speciﬁcation of the intruder was subject to the same exe-
cution semantics as the other roles, it could not be speciﬁed in the same
way as regular principals.
(ii) Typing allows a very precise characterization of what the intruder’s ca-
pabilities actually are. This is clearly manifested in the rule clusters that
formalize access to public information and fresh data generation.
(iii) All but the fresh data generation rules can be automatically generated
from the term language, and their typing [4] and access control rules [3].
We conjecture that which fresh data generation rules are admissible is de-
pendent on the protocol the intruder is running against. In turn, this may
be realized by constraining the fresh data that a principal can generate
by imposing a stricter access control policy.
6.3 An Optimized Dolev-Yao Intruder
The role set given in the previous section provides a declarative speciﬁcation of
the capabilities of the Dolev-Yao intruder. It is however too non-deterministic
to stand as a basis for the form of model-checking simulation needed to an-
alyze protocols, possibly uncovering attacks. We will now present a more
operational variant of the Dolev-Yao intruder that eliminates a useless con-
sequence of this non-determinism: looping behaviors caused by the intruder
assembling a message and then taking it apart, and then recomposing it, etc.
ad inﬁnitum.
Whenever the adversary intercepts a message, we will have him decompose
it in its most elementary bits, store them in a dedicated memory predicate,
and construct any message intended for transmission from stored elementary
terms, without the possibility of undoing his own work. We therefore partition
the actions of the intruder in three distinct activities: message decomposition,
storage of elementary information, and message construction. This idea was
ﬁrst proposed in [19] and analyzed in an earlier version of MSR in [8].
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We replace the single memory predicateMI( ) used in Section 6.2 with three
predicates, DI( ), AI( ) and CI( ). The ﬁrst is intended to contain messages
while they are Decomposed into their elementary constituents. The second
holds the Atomic terms learnt in this way. The third is used in the message
Construction phase. Our signature shall therefore contain the following four
declarations:
I : principal
D : principal × msg
A : principal × atm
C : principal × msg
The interception and transmission rules are updated as follows:
(∀t : msg. N(t) → DI(t))I (∀t : msg. CI(t) → N(t))I
Observe that an intercepted message is placed in the decomposition memory
predicate since it must be disassembled before its elementary constituents can
be used. Dually, only constructed messages can be transmitted over the public
network. This is enforced by having a construction predicate in the antecedent
of the rule on the right.
The rules that dealt with composite message in Section 6.2 are adapted by
replacing the generic MI( ) predicate with the appropriate reﬁnement. When
decomposing a message, its components may need further disassembling. Du-
ally, messages intended for transmission are built by putting together con-
structible pieces. Keys constitute an exception to this rule: they are clearly
atomic and therefore can be accessed from the A predicate where such infor-
mation is stored. We also need to copy them to the consequent of rules so that
the intruder can use them again for other encryptions (as we will see shortly,
this optimized scheme does without an explicit duplication rule).
(
∀t1, t2 : msg. DI(t1 t2) → DI(t1)DI(t2)
)I(
∀t1, t2 : msg. CI(t1)CI(t2) → CI(t1 t2)
)I

∀A,B : principal.∀k : shK A B.
∀t : msg.
DI({t}k)
AI(k)
→ DI(t)
AI(k)


I

∀A,B : principal.∀k : shK A B.
∀t : msg.
CI(t)
AI(k)
→ CI({t}k)
AI(k)


I


∀A : principal.
∀k: pubK A.
∀k′ : privK k.
∀t : msg.
DI({ t} k)
AI(k
′)
→ DI(t)
AI(k
′)


I
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
∀A : principal.∀k : pubK A.
∀t : msg.
CI(t)
AI(k)
→ CI({ t} k)
AI(k)


I
It should be observed that the above rules do not apply to situations where
the intruder does not know the decryption key of a ciphered message. We will
treat this case shortly.
Once a captured message has been reduced to its atomic constituents, they
are memorized in individual A predicates by the following rule:
(
∀a : atm. DI(a) → AI(a)
)I
The atomicity of the decomposable message in this rule is enforced by assigning
type atm to the variable a.
As observed earlier, not all terms can be decomposed into to their atomic
constituents. In particular encrypted message cannot be exposed unless the
intruder has access to the proper decryption key. The following rule is intended
to deal with this situation. Here, a message t being disassembled is promoted
as a constructible term. Notice that a copy of t is is kept in the decomposition
queue in the eventuality that later captured information may allow breaking
t into more elementary pieces.
(
∀t : msg. DI(t) → DI(t)CI(t)
)I
It should be observed that this rule provides a loophole in the scheme discussed
in this section since it allows any message to transit from the decomposition
pool to the construction queue without accessing its atomic components. To
avoid this, it would be tempting to specialize this rule to the situations where
t is indeed an encrypted message. This would however violate the access
control policy in [3]. A precise speciﬁcation that avoids these problems requires
modifying the language underlying MSR to allow for partial pattern matching
and negative patterns, which are the subject of current research.
The next rule makes an atomic component available as a constructible
message. Copying is required since this object could be needed again later.
(
∀a : atm. AI(a) → AI(a)CI(a)
)I
We continue with the rules that allow accessing public information and
create fresh data. The changes with respect to the rules presented in the
previous section is limited to replacing the memory predicate M with A ,
since the objects under consideration are atomic.
(∀A : principal. · → AI(A))I
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(∀A : principal.
∀k : shK I A. · → AI(k)
)I (∀A : principal.
∀k : shK A I. · → MI(k)
)I
(∀A : principal.
∀k : pubK A. · → AI(k)
)I (∀k : pubK I.
∀k′ : privK k. · → AI(k
′)
)I
(
· → ∃n : nonce. AI(n)
)I (
· → ∃m : atm. AI(m)
)I
We conclude with the rules handling generic n+ 1-ary memory predicates
M ′I the intruder may have. We treat them as if the terms they record were
coming from the network: we read them into the decomposition queue, and
store them back from the construction stack. Clearly, these rules can be
specialized whenever we have additional information on the data stored in
each argument of M ′I . In particular, atomic terms can be read to and from
the AI( ) predicates. We have the following two schematic roles, where i is an
index in 2, . . . , n+ 1:


∀t1 : τ1.
· · ·
∀tn : τn.
M ′I (t1, . . . , tn) →
M ′I (t1, . . . , tn)
DI(ti)


I


∀t1 : τ1.
· · ·
∀tn : τn.
∀t′i : τi.
M ′I (t1, . . . , tn)
CI(t
′
i)
→ M ′I (t1, . . . , t′i, . . . , tn)


I
It should be noted that we have structured the above rules in such a way
that no explicit copying rule is ever needed: whenever atomic or decomposable
information is accessed for constructing an outgoing message, we always leave a
copy for future use. On a similar note, we omit the deletion rule of Section 6.2:
this version of the Dolev-Yao intruder only accumulate information, never
eliminates it.
Proving the correctness of this optimized intruder model with respect to
the role set presented in Section 6.2 is a rather simple task: indeed, mapping
the specialized predicates DI( ), AI( ) and CI( ) back to MI( ) yields a set of
rules that is almost identical to our original role set for the Dolev-Yao intruder.
The minor discrepancies brought about by this translation are corrected by
uses of the structural rule of deletion, and the elimination of one redundantly
produced rule, whose antecedent and consequent are identical. Alternatively,
this property can be seen as an instance of a more general result that states
that the Doley-Yao intruder model subsumes every other intruder model that
plays by the rules of the Dolev-Yao abstraction. This theorem is formally
proved in [3].
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The proof of the corresponding completeness result, which shows that our
optimized model is powerful enough to simulate the original Dolev-Yao in-
truder, is instead quite complex on the basis of the deﬁnitions given in this
paper. The intuitively simple translation of runs into the optimized model is
complicated by the need to perform context-dependent permutations between
rule applications. Keeping track of ﬁring dependencies among rules, while
abstracting from unrelated rules that happen to be interleaved with them,
is not handled elegantly in our execution model. Proofs of these forms call
for a more abstract view of execution, that chains together cooperating rules.
Strand spaces [16] have those qualities and we are currently developing a sim-
ilar model on top of our current execution rules. The core of this proof in the
context of strand spaces can indeed be found in [17].
7 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we have presented the execution model ofMSR, a strongly-typed
framework for the speciﬁcation of security protocols. MSR extends previous
attempts at using multiset rewriting for formalizing crypto-protocols [8,15,9]
with the introduction of dependent types as a simple and eﬀective mechanism
for expressing relations among objects (e.g. between a key and its owner), and
by permitting rules to mention memory predicates that allow a principal to
store data that survives role termination. The typing infrastructure of MSR
is discussed in detail in [4] while the related notion of access control is the
subject of [3]. Memory predicates are a powerful mechanism that enables
the speciﬁcation of protocols consisting of a set of coordinated subprotocols
that exchange data and pass control [5]. The intruder model that best ﬁts
the analysis of a given protocol is indeed expressed as a collection of such
subprotocols that communicate through dedicated memory predicates. We
exempliﬁed this feature by presenting two detailed speciﬁcations of the Dolev-
Yao intruder [20,14]. The execution model ofMSR is based on parallel multiset
rewriting. We proved the admissibility of this approach with respect to the
interleaving model that we considered in our previous work [8,9].
In addition to the execution model presented here, MSR also embeds an
extensive type system, fully discussed in [4], as well as a set of judgments and
rules that formalize the notion of access control [3]. In the near future, we plan
to develop MSR in three directions. First we want to extend our collection of
case studies [5] to encompass not only the most popular authentication proto-
cols [10], but also fair exchange protocols and schemes developed for achieving
secure multicast (we are currently formalizing the OFT key management pol-
icy [2]). Second, we are developing an operational execution model as a basis
for simulation and model checking. This involves in particular delaying the
instantiation of universal variables to limit non-determinism. Still on the
pragmatic terrain, we are devising support for type reconstruction aimed at
speeding up the correct formalization of a protocol. Third, we are designing a
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ﬂexible strand-like notation to describe protocol runs [16,17]. This is intended
to simplify formal reasoning on chains of dependent rule applications while
abstracting from non-interfering rules that may happen to be interleaved with
them.
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A Collected Rules
This appendix collects the grammatical productions, judgments and rules used throughout
the paper for the convenience of the reader. More speciﬁcally, the syntax ofMSR is summa-
rized in Section A.1. The minimal typing infrastructure needed in this paper is displayed
in Section A.2. The deﬁnition of substitution for MSR is given in Section A.3. Finally,
we collect the executions judgments of our language and associated inference rules in Sec-
tion A.4. For the convenience of the reader, we specify the page number where each notion
is ﬁrst introduced.
A.1 Syntax
Atomic messages: a ::= A (Principal) [p. 4]
| k (Key)
| n (Nonce)
| m (Raw datum)
Parametric messages: t ::= a (Atomic messages) [p. 4]
| x (Variables)
| t1 t2 (Concatenation)
| {t}k (Symmetric-key encryption)
| { t} k (Asymmetric-key encryption)
Message tuples: t ::= · (Empty tuple) [p. 9]
| t, t (Tuple extension)
States: S ::= · (Empty state) [p. 11]
| S, N(t) (Extension with a network predicate)
| S, Ll(t ) (Extension with a role state predicate)
| S, MA(t ) (Extension with a memory predicate)
Types: τ ::= principal (Principals) [p. 5]
| nonce (Nonces)
| shKAB (Shared keys)
| pubKA (Public keys)
| privK k (Private keys)
| atm (Atomic messages)
| msg (Messages)
Type tuples: τ ::= · (Empty tuple) [p. 10]
| τ (x) × τ (Type tuple extension)
Predicate sequences: lhs ::= · (Empty predicate sequence) [p. 14]
| lhs, N(t) (Extension with a network predicate)
| lhs, L(e) (Extension with a role state predicate)
| lhs, MA(t ) (Extension with a memory predicate)
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Right-Hand sides: rhs ::= lhs (Sequence of message predicates) [p. 14]
| ∃x : τ. rhs (Fresh data generation)
Rule: r ::= lhs → rhs (Rule core) [p. 13]
| ∀x : τ. r (Parameter closure)
Rule collections: ρ ::= · (Empty role) [p. 15]
| ∃L : τ . ρ (Parameter declaration)
| r, ρ (Extension with a rule)
Protocol theories: P ::= · (Empty protocol theory) [p. 16]
| P, ρ∀A (Extension with a generic role)
| P, ρA (Extension with an anchored role)
Active role sets: R ::= · (No active role) [p. 16]
| R, ρA (Extension with an instantiated role)
Signatures: Σ ::= · (Empty signature) [p. 7]
| Σ, a : τ (Atomic message declaration)
| Σ, Ll : τ (Local state predicate declaration) [p. 11]
| Σ, M : τ (Memory predicate declaration) [p. 11]
Snapshot: C ::= [S]RΣ [p. 20]
A.2 Typing Rules
τ :: τ ′ τ is a subsort of τ ′ [p. 6]
Σ  t : τ Term t has type τ in signature Σ [p. 7]
τ :: τ ′ τ is a subsort of τ ′ [p. 6]
ss atm
atm :: msg
ss pr
principal :: atm
ss nnc
nonce :: atm
ss shK
shKAB :: atm
ss pbK
pubKA :: atm
ss pvK
privK k :: atm
Σ  t : τ Term t has type τ in signature Σ [p. 7]
Σ  t1 : msg Σ  t2 : msg
mtp cnc
Σ  t1 t2 : msg
Σ  t : msg Σ  k : shKAB
mtp ske
Σ  {t}k : msg
Σ  t : msg Σ  k : pubKA
mtp pke
Σ  {{t} k : msg
Σ  t : τ ′ τ ′ :: τ
mtp ss
Σ  t : τ
mtp a
(Σ, a : τ,Σ′)  a : τ
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A.3 Substitutions
[t/x]t′ [t/x]τ
[t/x]a = a [t/x]principal = principal
[t/x]y =
{
t if y = x
y otherwise [t/x]nonce = nonce
[t/x](t′1 t
′
2) = ([t/x]t
′
1) ([t/x]t
′
2) [t/x]shKAB = shK ([t/x]A) ([t/x]B)
[t/x]{t′}k = {[t/x]t′}[t/x]k [t/x]pubKA = pubK ([t/x]A)
[t/x]{ t′} k = { [t/x]t′} [t/x]k [t/x]privK k = privK ([t/x]k)
[t/x]atm = atm
[t/x]msg = msg
[t/x]t [t/x]τ
[t/x]· = · [t/x]· = ·
[t/x](t′, t) = ([t/x]t′), ([t/x]t ) [t/x](τ (y) × τ) = ([t/x]τ)(y) × ([t/x]τ)
[t/x]lhs [t/x]rhs
[t/x]· = · [t/x]lhs = [t/x]lhs
[t/x](lhs, N(t)) = ([t/x]lhs), N([t/x]t) [t/x](∃y : τ. rhs)
[t/x](lhs, L(e)) = ([t/x]lhs), L([t/x]e) = ∃y : ([t/x]τ). ([t/x]rhs)
[t/x](lhs, MA(t )) = ([t/x]lhs), M[t/x]A([t/x]t )
[t/x]r [t/x]ρ
[t/x](lhs → rhs) = ([t/x]lhs)→ ([t/x]rhs) [t/x]· = ·
[t/x](∀y : τ. r) = ∀y : ([t/x]τ). ([t/x]r) [t/x](∃L : τ . ρ) = ∃L : ([t/x]τ). ([t/x]ρ)
[t/x](r, ρ) = ([t/x]r), ([t/x]ρ)
[Ll/L]lhs [Ll/L]rhs
[Ll/L]· = · [Ll/L]lhs = [Ll/L]lhs
[Ll/L](lhs, N(t)) = ([Ll/L]lhs), N(t) [Ll/L](∃x : τ. rhs)
[Ll/L](lhs, MA(t )) = ([Ll/L]lhs), MA(t ) = ∃x : τ. ([Ll/L]rhs)
[Ll/L](lhs, L′(e)) =
{
([Ll/L]lhs), Ll(e) if L = L′
([Ll/L]lhs), L′(e) otherwise
[Ll/L]r [Ll/L]ρ
[Ll/L](lhs → rhs) = ([Ll/L]lhs)→ ([Ll/L]rhs) [Ll/L]· = ·
[Ll/L](∀x : τ. r) = ∀x : τ. ([Ll/L]r) [Ll/L](∃L′ : τ . ρ) = ∃L′ : τ . ([Ll/L]ρ)
[Ll/L](r, ρ) = ([Ll/L]r), ([Ll/L]ρ)
A.4 Execution Rules
(rhs)Σ  (lhs)Σ′ Right-hand side instantiation [p. 22]
r  [S]Σ  [S′]Σ′ Rule application [p. 21]
P  C −→ C ′ One-step sequential ﬁring [p. 20]
P  C −→∗ C ′ Multi-step sequential ﬁring [p. 23]
P  C =⇒ C ′ One-step parallel ﬁring [p. 24]
P  C =⇒∗ C ′ Multi-step parallel ﬁring [p. 25]
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(rhs)Σ  (lhs)Σ′ Right-hand side instantiation [p. 22]
exs seq
(lhs)Σ  (lhs)Σ
([a/x]rhs)(Σ,a:τ)  (lhs)Σ′
exs nnc
(∃x : τ. rhs)Σ  (lhs)Σ′
r  [S]Σ  [S′]Σ′ Rule application [p. 21]
Σ  t : τ [t/x]r  [S]Σ  [S′]Σ′
exs all
(∀x : τ. r)  [S]Σ  [S′]Σ′
(rhs)Σ  (lhs ′)Σ′
exs core
(lhs → rhs)  [S, lhs]Σ  [S, lhs ′]Σ′
P  C −→ C ′ One-step sequential ﬁring [p. 20]
exs arole
(P, ρA)  [S]RΣ −→ [S]R,ρ
A
Σ
Σ  A : principal
exs grole
(P, ρ∀A)  [S]RΣ −→ [S]R,([A/A]ρ)
A
Σ
exs rsp
P  [S]R,(∃L:τ. ρ)AΣ −→ [S]R,([Ll/L]ρ)
A
(Σ,Ll:τ)
r  [S]Σ  [S′]Σ′
exs rule
P  [S]R,(r,ρ)AΣ −→ [S′]R,(ρ)
A
Σ′
exs skp
P  [S]R,(r,ρ)AΣ −→ [S]R,(ρ)
A
Σ
exs dot
P  [S]R,(·)AΣ −→ [S]RΣ
P  C −→∗ C ′ Multi-step sequential ﬁring [p. 23]
exs it0
P  C −→∗ C
P  C −→ C ′ P  C ′ −→∗ C ′′
exs itn
P  C −→∗ C ′′
P  C =⇒ C ′ One-step parallel ﬁring [p. 24]
exp id
P  C =⇒ C
P  [S1]R1Σ −→ [S′1]R
′
1
(Σ,Σ′1)
P  [S2]R2Σ =⇒ [S′2]R
′
2
(Σ,Σ′2)
exp par
P  [S1, S2] (R1,R2)Σ =⇒ [S′1, S′2] (R
′
1,R
′
2)
(Σ,Σ′1,Σ
′
2)
P  C =⇒∗ C ′ Multi-step parallel ﬁring [p. 25]
exp it0
P  C =⇒∗ C
P  C =⇒ C ′ P  C ′ =⇒∗ C ′′
exp itn
P  C =⇒∗ C ′′
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